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THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST ACT OF 1890.1

The questions involved in the decision of a case arising
under the Act of Congress of July 2, 1890,2 commonly, although
perhaps erroneously, referred to as the Sherman Anti-Trust Law,8
seem to be as follows: (I) Has Congress the constitutional
power to enact the statute in question? (2) Is the act a proper
exercise of the constitutional power vested in Congress? These
two questions have, after much discussion, been answered in the
affirmative on the ground that Congress has power, under the
Constitution, to regulate interstate commerce, and that the Act
of i8go is, on its face, a regulation of that commerce.4 (3) Does
the case at bar come within the regulation prescribed by Congress? The answer to this question involves these several con'The decisions on the act (189o to 1912) have been reprinted in four
voluncs by the United States Government, and as they furnish a most convenient access to the authorities, parallel citations to this publication have
been added under the abbreviation "Fed. A. T. Dec."
2C. 647, 26 Stat. 2o9 (U. S..Comp. St. igor, p. 32oo).
a Mr. Win. B. Hornblower, in i r CoL LAw R v, at p. 7o, points out that
the designation of the law as the Sherman Act is a misnomer, as Mr. Sherman apparently had nothing whatever to do with framing it referring to
Senator Hoar's Autobiography, Vol. II, p. 363.
' For arguments in favor of the constitutionality of the act, see Northern
Securities Co. v. U. S. (9o4) x93 U. S. I97, 24 Sup. Ct Rep. 436, 48 L Ed.
679, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 338; Harlan, J., dissenting in U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co.
(1895) x56 U. S. x, 75 Sup. Ct. 249, 39 L. Ed. 325, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 379;
U. S. v. Joint Traffic Asso. (1898) 171 U. S. 505, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 24, 43 L Ed.
259, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 869. For the arguments against its constitutionality,

(73)

74

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

siderations: (a) the text of the statute, (b) what is interstate
commerce, (c) the law as it stood before the act was passed,
(d) the evil to be remedied, (e) the facts of the case, (f) the
remedy to be applied or penalty inflicted. We have already discussed (c) and (d) of question 3, 5 and we shall now concern
ourselves with (a), (e) and (f), with certain subsidiary topics
which will be indicated from time to time, excluded from lack of
space. Thus we shall not consider the question of the extraterritorial ' effect of the act or discuss questions of practice and
pleading.7 So also as the conception of interstate commerce is a
somewhat technical notion peculiar to American constitutional
law, upon which there is an immense mass of authority, we shall
refer to it only incidentally in discussing the question of direct
and indirect restraints.
see White, J., dissenting in Northern Securities Co. v. U. S. (1904) 193 U. S.
197, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436, 48 L. Ed. 679, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 338; Win. D. Guthrie, ii HAMY. LAW REV. 8o (1897); Victor Morawetz. i7 HARV. LAW REv. 533
(i9o4). Mr. Wv. L Royall, in 73 Cent. Law Jour. 59, et seq., is of the
opinion that the constitutionality of the act is not yet settled.
See U. S. v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co. (i9o8) 165 Fed. 742, 3 Fed.
A. T. Dec. 5z4, as to constitutionality of the provision of the Act Feb. ix,
1903, c. 544, 32 Stat. 823 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. i9o7, p. 95r.), authorizing the
expediting of certain cases and a hearing before not less than three judges
of the Circuit Court.
'a12 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEw, 97-133, 220 to 251, see especially 246-25t.

'For a discussion of this subject, see article by Mr. Warren B. Hunt
in 6 ILL. LAW REV. 34, in which he examines the case of American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co. (199o)
213 U. S. 347, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 511, 53 L Ed.
826, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 648, affirming i66 Fed. 261, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 563,
which affirmed i6o Fed. 184, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 372; 153 Fed. 943 3 Fed. A.
T. Dec. 262; Cf. Thomsen v. Union Castle Mail S. S. Co. (x9o8) z66 Fed.
251, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 548, reversing (i9o7) 149 Fed. 933, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec.
lo8; U. S. v. Hamburg-American Line, et al. (19i1), 4 Fed. A. T. Dec. 44o,
apparently omitted from the Federal Reporter.
'NOTE ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING.

For convenience of reference, some of the principal decisions on questions of practice and pleading have been collected as follows:
Proceedingsin equity by the U. S. under §4- U. S. only can proceed in
equity under §4; Metcalf v. American School Furn. Co. (1903) I22 Fed. xi5,
2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 234, see io8 Fed. 909, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 75, 113 Fed. io2,

2 Fed. A. T. Dec. Ii;

Pidcock v. Harrington (j894) 64 Fed. 821, i Fed.
A. T. Dec. 377, bill dismissed; Leonard v. Abner-Drury Brewing Co. (19o5)
25 Appeal (D. C.) Cases i61, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. I; Blindell v. Hagan (i803)
54 Fed. 40, i Fed. A. T. Dec. io6, 56 Fed. 6pt, I Fed. A. T. Dec. 182; Greer,
.Mills & Co. v. Stoller, et al. (1896), 77 Fed. I, i Fed. A. T. Dec. 620; Gulf C.
& S. F. Ry. Co.. ct al., v. Miami S. S. Co. (1898) 86 Fed. 4o7, i Fed. A. T. Dec.
823: Southern Ind. Ex. Co. v. U. S. Ex. Co., et al. (1898), 88 Fed. 659, 1 Fed.
A. T. Dec. 862, 92 Fed. 1022, x Fed. A. T. Dec. 992; Minnesota v. Northern
Securities Co. (I90o4), t94 U. S. 48, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 598,48 L Ed. 870, 2 Fed.
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A. T. Dec. 533, reversing 123 Fed. 692, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. .46; a state cannot
proceed in equity under the statute for an injunction to dissolve an unlaw-

ful combination. U. S. v. Terminal Assn. (1912) 197 Fed. 446, where the
question was raised as to the right of one judge to direct a decre after

reversal by the Supreme Court. As to parties defendant in proceeding
against an unincorporated association, see U. S. v. Coal Dealers' Asso. (1898)
85 Fed. 252, I Fed. A. T. Dec. 749.

Miscellaneous:
As to production of documents on subpoena duces tecun and immunity
of witness, U. S. v. Terminal R. Assn., et al. (igo6), 148 Fed. 486,
Fed.
A. T. Dec. 34, and (1907) 154 Fed. 268, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 265; Hale v.
Henkel (1906) 201 U. S. 43, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370, So L. Ed. 652, 2 Fed. A. T.
Dec. 874, affirming (19o5). In re Hale, I39 Fed. 496, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 804;
McAllister v. Henkel (19o6), 2oi U. S. go, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 385, 5o L Ed. 671,
2 Fed. A. T. Dec. gig; Nelson v. U. S. (1go6) 2oi U. S. 92, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep.
358, 5o L. Ed. 673, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 92o; Alexander v. U. S. (19o6)

2oi U.

S. I17, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356, So L Ed. 686, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 945; U. S. v.
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., el al. (igix), 187 Fed. 232, 4 Fed. A. T. Dec.
255. As
to jurisdictional amount on appeal to Supreme
Court of U. S., see
U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn. (1897) 166 U. S. _9o, 17 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 540, 41 L Ed. 1oo7, ! Fed. A. T. Dec. 648.

As to practice in taking testimony before a master or examiner, see
U. S. v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., et al. (igxi), 187 Fed. 232, 4 Fed. A. T.
Dec. 255.

As to argument that the jurisdiction conferred by this section is an
unwarrantable invasion of the right of trial by jury, see Woods, J., in U. S.
v. Debs (1894) 64 Fed. 724 at 753, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 322 at 359.
As to injunction against persons not named in the bill, see U. S. v.
Elliott (1894) 64 Fed. 27, I Fed. A. T. Dec. 3i; U. S. v. Agler (1894) 62
Fed. 824, x Fed. A. T. Dec. 94.
As to evidence admissible to prove the combination, see U. S. v. Workingman's Amalg. Council of New Orleans, et al. (1893), 54 Fed. 994, x Fed.
A. T. Dec. n1o.

As to Act of February u, 1903, C. 544, 32 Stat 823 (U. S. Comp. St
Supp.. 1907, p. 951) authorizing the expediting of proceedings and hearing
in the Circuit Court, see U. S. v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co. (i9o8) x65
Fed. 742,3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 524.

Preliminary injunction will not be granted where defendant denies the
material allegations of the plaintiff's bill because the United States is not
required to give bond, U. S. v. Jellico Mtn. Coal & Coke Co. (x89o) 43 Fed.
898, x Fed. A. T. Dec. 1; but see U. S. v. Coal Dealers' Assn. (1898) 85 Fed.
252, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 74.

For practice as to joining non-resident defendants, see U. S. v. Standard

Oil Co. (1907) 152 Fed. 290, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 173.
For practice of Circuit Court interfering with an order granting or continuing a temporary injunction, see Workingmen's Amalg. Council v. U. S.
(1893) 57 Fed. 85, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 184. A valuable collection of the decrees

which have been entered in proceedings by the United States will be found
among the exhibits filed in the case of U. S. v. Union Pac. Ry. (1913) 226
U. S. 470, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 162, 57 L. Ed. T62. For this reference the writer is
indebted to his learned friend, Luther E. Hewitt, Esq., of the Philadelphia Bar
Association Library.
Proccedings at Law Under Section 7. (a) As to pleading:
Declaration held bad for indefiniteness and uncertainty in Rice v. Standard
Oil Co. (igo5) 134 Fed. 464, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 633.
As to irrelevant and redundant matter in complaint, see Ware-Kramer
Tobacco Co., et al., v. American Tobacco Co. (igio) 178 Fed. 117, 3 Fed.
A. T. Dec. 766.
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For discussion as to sufficiency of complaint, see Ware-Kra-er Tobacco
Co., et al., v. Americat' Tobacco Co., et al. (I9io), i8o Fed. x6o, 3 Fed.
A. T. Dec. 780.
Not sufficient to frame declaration in words of the statute, must set
forth elements of the offense, demurrer sustained, Cilley v. United Shoe
Machinery Co. (1907) 152 Fed. 726, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 2q3 (1913); 2q7 Fed.
598; Strout v. United Shoe Machinery Co., et al. (1913), 2o2 Fed. 6o2.

Bill setting up claim for damages under §7 and for an injunction restraining defendant from using complainant's trade-mark is multifarious, Block v.
Standard Distilling & Distributing Co. (t899) 95 Fed. 978, I Fed. A. T. Dec.
993; Metcalf v. American School Furn. Co. (igoi) 1o8 Fed. gog, 2 Fed.
A. T. Dec. 75.
As to allegation of interstate commerce or diverse citizenship, see Bishop
v. American Preservers Co., t a. (1892), 5t Fed. 272, I Fed. A. T. Dec. 49;
see also Loewe v. Lawlor (19o5) 142 Fed. 216, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 854; Buckeye
Powder Co. v. E. 1. duPont de Nemours Powder Co., ct al. (19t2), 196 Fed.
514
As to ordering bill of particulars, see Locker v. American Tobacco
Co.
(1912) i94 Fed. 232. See Buckeye Powder Co. v. Hazard Powder Co. (1913)
25 Fed. 287, where a motion to compel witness to answer was granted.

Action under §7 must be for acts completed when suit begun, consequently plaintiff cannot bring in corporations organized after action brought;
Locker v. American Tobacco Co. (1912) 197 Fed. 494.

(b) As to damages:
Loder v. Jayne, et al. (79o6), 142 Fed. 1010, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 976, judgment reversed in Jayne v. Loder ('9o6) 149 Fed. 21, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 65;
see latter decision particularly as to this point; Chattanooga Fdy. & Pipe
Works v. Atlanta (19o6) 203 U. S. 390, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65, 51 L. Ed. 241, 3
Fed. A. T. Dec. 113, affirming 127 Fed. 23, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. z9g, which

reversed ioi Fed. 900, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. ii; Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. R.
Co. (191o) 183 Fed. 548, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 969, reversing 162 Fed. 354, 2
Fed. A. T. Dec. 38o see 175 Fed. 320; Monarch Tobacco Works v. American
Tobacco Co. (19o8) I65 Fed. 774, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. _r4; Gibbs v. McNeeley,
el aL. (igoo), to2 Fed. 594, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 25; see 107 Fed. 210,2 Fed. A. T.
Dec. 71, i18 Fed. 120, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. I9-4. In Central Coal & Coke Co. v.
iii Fed. 96, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 94, the case was discussed
Hartman (9o)
solely on the ground that there was no proof of any reasonable damage. The
only damages claimed were the loss of expected profits in business.
(c) Jurisdiction:
As to district in which suit may be brought, see Ware-Kramer Tobacco
Co., et al., v. American Tobacco Co., et al. (xgio), i8o Fed. i6o, 3 Fed. A. T.
Dec. 780.
As to plaintiff bringing suit in the district of his residence against foreign
corporation doing business in that district, Michigan Aluminum Fdy. Co. v.
Aluminum Castings Co. (i91i) igo Fed. 879; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arlington Heights Fruit Co. (191!)

191 Fed. jot.

See also Dueber Watch Case

Mfg. Co. v. E. Howard Watch and Clock Co., et al. (x8gS), 66 Fed. 637,
i Fed. A. T. Dec. 421, affirming 55 Fed. 851, i Fed. A. T. Dec. z78. Strout
v. United Shoe Machinery Co. (1912)

195 Fed. 313.

As to attorney's fee, see Montague Co. v. Lowry (i9o4) 193 U. S. 38,
24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 307, 48 L. Ed. 608, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 327.
(d) As to parties:
Action cannot be maintained against state officials because state itself
is an essential party, Lowenstein v. Evans (1895) 69 Fed. 9o8, 1 Fed. A. T.
Dec. 598.
Where the business injured is that of a corporation, the right of action
is in the corporation, and a stockholder or creditor cannot sue, Ames v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co. (909) x66 Fed. 82o, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 586; Breed
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The text of the statute is given in full in a note for convenience of reference.8 It is important to bear in mind that trade
may be restrained by (i) a monopoly which may be of several
kinds, (2) a combination which may appear in several forms,
(3) the performance of a contract.
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co. 09og) x66 Fed. 82. 3 Fed. A. T. Dec 593; Loeb
v. Eastman Kodak Co. (1070)
183 Fed. 704. 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 975. Dictum
contra of Knappen, J.. in Bigelow v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co. (1907) 155
Fed. 869 at 879, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 293 at 309, may be disregarded. For the
proper practice, see Penna. Sugar Ref. Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co.,
ct al. (i9o8), i6o Fed. 144. 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 369, where complaint was dismissed on other grounds reversed in 166 Fed. 254, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 552.
(e) Miscellaneous:
Pendency of a suit in a State court cannot be pleaded in abatement of
an action in U. S. Court to recover damages under §7, Lowe v. Lawlor (1904)
130 Fed. 633, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 563.
As to application of statute to combinations formed before the passage
of the act. see Dueher Watch Case Mfg. Co. v. E. Howard Watch & Clock
Co.. et al. (85) 66 Fed. 637, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 421, affirming 55 Fed. 851.

I Fed. A. T. Dec. 178.

Municipal corporation may sue. every member of the combination is
liable ipso facto, and state statute of limitations applies, Chattanooga Foundry
& Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta (io6) 203 U. S. 390, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65,
i L. Ed. 241, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 113. Statute of limitations runs from the
time the plaintiff discovers the existence of the combination and the cause
of action. American Tobacco Co. v. Peoples Tobacco Co. (1913) 2o4 Fed.
ss.
As to compulsory production of documents by defendant,
see American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. (1907) 153 Fed. 943, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 262.
Settlement of the suit in a state court an accord and satisfaction of
proceedings under §7 for treble damages. Clabaugh v. Southern W. Grocers
Assn. (91o) 181 Fed. 7o6, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 812.
, Plaintiff must show that the business in question is interstate commerce,
Dueher Watch Case \Ifg. Co. Y. Howard Watch & Clock Co. (1893) 66 Fed.
637, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 42z, 55 Fed. 851, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 178.
Burden of proof on plaintiff, see Loder v. Jayne (19o6) z42 Fed. 1010, 2

Fed. A. T. Dec. 976.
Recovery of treble damages can only be bad by direct action and not
by way of set-off in an action for price of goods sold by a company violating
the act. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. (1902) 184 U. S. 540, 22 Sup. CL
Rep. 431, 46 L. Ed. 679, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. H8, affirming 99 Fed. 354, 2 Fed.

A. T. Dec. x.

AN Act TO PROTECT TRADE AND

Co.M.%ERcE AGAINST UNLAWFUL RESTRAINTS
AND MONOPOLIES.

Be it enacted, etc., Section I. Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or othervise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.
Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such
combination or conspiracy shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
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Mono',olies and combinations are states of facts, dramatic
circumstances which may be brought about in several different
ways, whereas the performance of a contract is a single act which
may or may not produce a combination or monopoly. A so-called
contract in restraint of trade may appear by itself simply as one
contract or as the foundation or part of the foundation of a combination, in which latter case the aspect of the contract as a contract is lost sight of in the combination. A distinction must
therefore be drawn between single contracts in restraint of trade,
and combinations in restraint of trade. In the former case, the
common law rule as to the validity of the restraint was determined by considerations personal to the covenantor and covenantee as well as considerations depending on the control of the
market, whereas in the case of the combination the only consideration was the effect of the combination on the market.
Two views have obtained as to the construction of the statute: (i) that it should be literally interpreted, and every case
coming within the description of the words used should be visited
with the penalties prescribed, irrespective of any rule of the
common law; (2) that the general words of the statute are to be
confined by the law as it existed when it was passed, and that the
test of what is unlawful is furnished by the principles of the cornSec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign
nations, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall
be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment
not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of
the court.

Sec. 3. Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in any territory of the United
States or of the District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce
between any such territory and another, or between any such territory or
territories and any state or states or the District of Columbia, or with foreign
nations, or between the District of Columbia and any state or states or foreign
nations, is hereby declared illegal.
Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such
combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and,
on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Sec. 4. The several circuit courts of the United States are hereby invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this act; and
it shall be the duty of the several district attorneys of the United States, in
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mon law. While, logically speaking, the first view may be sustainable, it is not the view of legislation which has been taken by
English speaking courts. The courts of England and of this
country have for hundreds of years treated the enactments of the
legislative branch of the government with considerable care and
tenderness. It requires but a short glance at the decisions of the
English courts and the decisions of the courts of several states
in this country, and of the Supreme Court itself in other cases,
to convince one that these courts have all habitually taken the
view that a statute must be reasonably interpreted, and where its
provisions are too drastic, words may be introduced into it or
constructions adopted which will bring about the result demanded
by the interests of the community. This is particularly true
when the statute in question has to do with, or as drawn comes
in conflict with, the economic life of the community. The most
conspicuous instances of this are the Statute of Uses, the Statute
of Frauds and the Statute of Wills, all of which have been subjected to judicial interpretation sometimes almost annulling the
their respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney-General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations.
Such proceedings may be by way of petition setting forth the case and
praying that such violation shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited.
When the parties complained of shall have been duly notified of such
petition the court shall proceed, as soon as may be, to the hearing and determination of the case; and pending such petition and before final decree, the court
may at any time make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall
be deemed just in the premises.
Sec. S. Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any proceeding under section four of this act may be pending, that the ends of
justice require that other parties should be brought before the court, the
court may cause them to be summoned, whether they reside in the district
in which the court is held or not; and subpoenas to that end may be served
in any district by the marshal thereof.
Sec. 6. Any property owned under any contract or by any combination,
or pursuant to any conspiracy (and being the subject thereof) mentioned in
section one of this act, and being in the course of transportation from one
state to another, or to a foreign country, shall be forfeited to the United
States, and may be seized and condemned by like proceedings as those provided by law for the forfeiture, seizure and condemnation of property imported into the United States contrary to law.
Sec. 7. Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
any other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared
to be unlawful by this act, may sue therefor in any circuit court of the
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found,
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three-fold
the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
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plain words of the statute. The reason is plain. Legislatures are
human, and as such they endeavor to solve the problems which
come before them in a necessarily human and imperfect manner.
The characteristic faults of parliamentary legislation have been
clearly pointed out by a learned author,9 and the Anti-Trust Act
which we are discussing is no better in these respects than the
average legislation of Parliament, of the state legislatures and
other acts of Congress.*O
We need not spend much time on this point because in fact
the statute has not yet been applied by the Supreme Court of the
United States to a contract, combination or monopoly which
would not have been equally invalid in a proper proceeding under
the rules of the common law. The only practical addition, therefore, to the law made by the statute is the remedy given the United
States, to obtain an injunction restraining violations of the act,
and the right of an individual to recover treble damages in an
action at law for a violation of its provisions.
The act enumerates a conspiracy in restraint of interstate
Sec. 8. That the word "person" or "persons" wherever used in this act
sball be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or
authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the
territories, the laws of any state, or the laws of any foreign country.
*"Parliamentary legislation, in short, if it is sometimes rapid and thorough-going, exhibits in this instance (the married women's property acts),
as in others, characteristic faults. It is the work of legislators who are
much influenced by the immediate opinion of the moment, who make laws
with little regard either to general principles or to logical consistency, and
who are deficient in the knowledge and skill of experts." The relation between law and public opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century,
A. V. Dicey, London, 1905, Pp. 395, 396. "Only in exceptional cases and
under the pressure of some crisis can English legislators be induced to carry
out a broad principle at one stroke to its logical and necessary consequences."
Ibid, p. 28.
The vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Harlan in Standard Oil Co. v. U.
S. (x9Ir) 221 U. S. i, 31, S. C. 502, s5 L. Ed. 6x9, 4 Fed. A. T. Dec. 79, cannot
be passed by without some comment. It must be confessed, however, on
careful reflection that the learned judge somewhat overshot the mark. No
intellect has yet been acute enough to define any of the executive, legislative
or judicial functions of the government to the exclusion of any of the others,
or clearly point out where one begins and the other ends. This difficulty is
inseparable from the construction of a written constitution such as ours.
The question of how far the court may go in construing a statute is more
one of practical expediency than of logical reasoning. There is, however,
serious objection to adopting a particular construction when thf. legislature
has, after the enactment of the statute, refused to amend the act in that
particular, and the dictum of Mr. Chief Justice White in this case is therefore open to grave criticism on this ground, particularly as the learned judge
failed to take any account of this objection in reaching the conclusion he did.
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trade as unlawful. No case has been found turning on any distinction between a conspiracy and a combination. We shall
therefore discuss the statute as if the word conspiracy had been
omitted, thereby evading the difficulties of the law on this subject which would require an article by itself.
A tabular analysis of the first, second and eighth sections is
appended in a note."
TITLE OF THE AcT.

The act is entitled "An act to protect trade and commerce
against unlawful restraints and monopolies," therein embodying
two misconceptions: (I) ti e idea that a restraint of trade is
unlawful when it has the effect of reducing the volume of trade.
A restraint of trade which is obnoxious to the common law may
exist with an increase in the volume of trade or tice versa. The
two have no connection whatever.12 (2) The idea that trade is
a concrete state of affairs which can be restrained. Trade is
only a generic name for the abstract conception covering the
multitude of individual acts of trading, and interstate trade is
"TABULAR ANALYSIS OF THE

Every

FIRST, SECOND AND EIGHTH SECTIONS.

Section x.
Contractst
of interin state
restraint
in the form of
Combination
etc., trade
trust or otherwise
Conspiracy

s ega.

Every person engaging in such contract, etc., shall be guilty, etc.
Section z

"Monopolize
Attempt to monoEvery

Person
Corporation
(by §8)

who
shall

polize or conCombine
spire with a
other person or
corporation to
monopolize

ballbe
nypart o f sillyh
nterstate
guilty,

u'This misconception sometimes appears in the cases. The argument was
advanced in U. S. v. Northern Securities Co., T2o Fed. 721 at 730, 2 Fed.
A. T. Dec. 215 at 228. that the combination attacked by the government was
valid because it would increase the volume of interstate traffic and thus
benefit the public, which notion was repudiated by the court. See Adams, J.,
in Arkansas Brokerage Co. v. Dunn and Powell, Inc. (igog), x73 Fed. 899
at 901, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 752 at 756.
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only an artificial mental picture of the sum total of individual

dealings in interstate trade. The only restraint of trade which
can exist in point of fact, and therefore the only restraint of
which the law can take any notice, is a restraint on some act or
acts of trading. The real point, therefore, is the freedom of specific
trading, and the title would be more accurately worded thus: "An
act to secure the freedom of engaging in interstate trade." The
statute nowhere defines the things it condemns as illegal, and
it has. therefore, 13 been frequently argued in aid of a liberal construction of the act, that the use of the word unlawful in the
title indicates an intention, in view of the general language of the
body, to condemn only those things unlawful de hors the act.
That is, unlawful by the common. law. 1 4 On the other hand, it
has been said that the title indicates the comprehensive scope of
the statute, the title being intended to refer to those restraints
and monopolies made unlawful by the body of the act. 15 This
argument is in aid of a strict construction of the act.
ANY PART OF INTERSTATE TRADE. 1 4

(i) By confining the phrase "interstate" to any particular
trade, as, for instance, the petroleum trade, the phrase means any
part of that trade, and consequently a combination of an insignificant number of dealers in a certain line having no effect on
the trade, must fall within the condemnation of the act, and yet
the combination will have no effect at all on the course of inter" This lack of definition has been frequently commented on: J. C. Carter,
arguendo, in U. S. v. Joint Traffic Assn. (x898) 171 U. S. 5oS at 513, i9 Sup.

Ct. Rep. 25, 43 L. Ed. 259, i Fed. A. T. Dec. 869 at 878. Sanborn, J., m
U. S. v. Trans. Mo. Freight Assn. (1893) 58 Fed. 58 at 67, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec.
186 at 197; American Biscuit Co. v. Klotz (1891) 44 Fed. 721 at 726, i Fed.
A. T. Dec. 2 at &
"Brewer, J., in Northern Securities Co. v. U. S. (i9o4) 193 U. S. 197 at
361, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 4.36, 48 L. Ed. 679, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 338 at 488. White,
J., in U. S. v. Freight Assn. (1897) 166 U. S. 290 at 352, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 54o,
41 L. Ed. ioo7, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 648 at 705.
"Peckham, J., in U. S. v. Freight Assn. (1897) 166 U. S. 29o at 327, 17
Sup. Ct. Rep. 540, 41 L- Ed. ioo7, i Fed. A. T. Dec. 648 at 682. Morrow, J.,
in U. S. v. Coal Dealers' Assn. (j898) 85 Fed. 252 at 26x, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec.
749 at 762.

"The doubt as to the meaning of the phrase "Any part of interstate
trade." does not seem to have raised any questions of particular importance.
It only appears in §2 in conjunction with "monopolize."
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state trade as a whole. This meaning is not consistent with a
liberal interpretation of the statute.
(2) By giving the phrase "interstate trade" the meaning of
applying to interstate trade as a whole, as a body of trade which
is under the jurisdiction of the Federal government extending
throughout the United States, the phrase "any part thereof" may
mean any part of that volume of trade, and therefore, in its narrowest meaning, to be confined to a particular line of business
and not to a fractional part of any line of business.1T
As ro REwuy.
The act, in addition to declaring certain acts unlawful,
affords four distinct remedies. It authorizes the United States
Government (i) by Section 4 to obtain an injunction restraining violations of the act, (z) by Section 6 to obtain a declaration
of forfeiture of the property involved, (3) by Section 3 to enforce its provisions by criminal proceedings. By Section 7,
private parties are authorized to sue at law and recover treble
damages for violation of the act. No case has arisen as to the
remedy under Section 6,18 and a discussion of criminal proceedings will be omitted from lack of space. 1 '
221 U. S. i at 61,
" Mr. C. J. White, in Standard Oil Co. v. U. S. (9ux)
31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, 53 L Ed. 619, 4 Fed. A. T. Dec. 79 at x3o, said:
"The commerce referred to by the words 'any part' construed in the light
of the manifest purpose of the statute, has both a geographical and distributive significance: that is, it includes any portion of the United States
and any one of the classes of things forming a part of interstate or foreign
commerce." No other reference to the subject has been found in the cases.
I As to §6, see remarks of Peckham, J., in U. S.v. Trans-Mo. Freight

Assn. (1897) 166 U. S. 290 at 313, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 54o, 41 L Ed. 1007, 1

Fed. A. T. Dec. 648 at 66&
Citations to some of the criminal cases are appended for convenience of
reference in case the learned reader should desire to pursue the matter
further. U. S. v. Greenhut (189z) 5o Fed. 469, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 30; In re
Coming (1892) 5i Fed. 2o5, i Fed. A. T. Dec. 33; In re Terrell (189z) si
Fed. 213, T Fed. A. T. Dec. 46; In re Greene (1892) 52 Fed. xo4, i Fed. A. T.
Dec. 54; U. S. v. Nelson (7892) 52 Fed. 646, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 77; U. S. v.
Patterson (1893) 55 Fed. 6o5, r Fed. A. T. Dec. 133, s. c. 59 Fed. 28o, i Fed.
A. T. Dec. 244; In re Grand Jury (1894) 62 Fed. 84o, I Fed. A. T. Dec.
301; U. S. v. Cassidy (1895) 67 Fed. 698, Y Fed. A. T. Dec. 449; U. S. v.

Armour Co. (j9o6) 142 Fed. 8o8, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 951; Moore v. U. S.
(1898) 85 Fed. 465. i Fed. A. T. Dec. 8T5; U. S. v. McAndrews & Forbes
(igo6) i49 Fed. 823, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 81, 149 Fed. 836. 3 Fed. A. T. Dec.
ioo; In re Charge to Grand Jury (1907) x5i Fed. 834, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 156;
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The criminal provisions should be inserted in a separate statute so the construction of the civil and penal provisos can go on
independently. Each now hampers the other, the court being
under the necessity of attempting to follow the same rule in
each case.
It is well settled that the United States cann6t proceed at
law under Section 7, nor can an individual proceed in equity under Section 4.20
In all cases where the Federal courts have jurisdiction independently of the act, as in the case of diverse citizenship, and the
validity of a contract or combination in restraint of trade or a
monopoly is drawn into question, the courts will proceed as before. In proceedings in equity the relief will conform to the
equitable remedies which would have been applied before the act
was passed, such as the retransfer of property, setting aside of a
conveyance, etc., 2 but will not extend to a dissolution of the
Tribolet v. U. S. (xga)
95 Pac. Rep. 8., 3 Fed. A T. Dec. 316; U. S. V.
Virginia-Carolina Cheniical Co., ef aL (igo8), 163 Fed. 395, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec.
395; Union Pacific Coal Co. v. U. S. (iog) 173 Fed. 737, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec.
731; U. S. v. Kissel (910) 218 U. S. 6oi, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 124, 54 L Ed.
1168, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 8M6, reversing 173 Fed. 82.3, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 744;
U. S. v. American Naval Stores Co., et al. (ig g), 186 Fed. 592, 4 Fed. A. T.
Dec. 48, 172 Fed. 455, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 679; U. S. v. Swift, ef al. (igir),
x86 Fed. roo2, 4 Fed. A. T. Dec. 53: U. S. v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. C6.,
et al. (gii), 187 Fed. 229, 4 Fed. A. T. Dec. 251; U. S. v. Patten (Igli) 226
U. S. 525, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 741, 57 L. Ed. 141. reversing 187Fed.664,4Fed.A.T.
Dec. 274; U. S. v. Swift (i911) 188 Fed. 92, 4 Fed. A. T. Dec. 288; Steers
v. U. S. (1911) 192 Fed. 1, 4 Fed. A. T. Dec. 427; It re Kittel (i92x) 1So Fed.
946, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 8o3; U. S. v. Heike (igo) 175 Fed. 852, U. S. v. John
Reardon Sons Co. (igix) igi Fed. 454. Some of the contempt cases are:
U. S. v. Agler (1894) 62 Fed. 824, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 294; In re Debs (1895)
x58 U. S. 564, i5 Sup. Ct Rep. goo, 39 L Ed. io92, i Fed. A. T. Dec. 56&
affirming 62 Fed. 724, x Fed. A. T. Dec. 322; U. S.- . Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry. Co. (igo5) 142 Fed. 176, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 831. Witnesses--Contempt in
refusing to answer: Foot v. Buchanan (19 0 2) 113 Fed. x56, 2 Fed. A. T. Dee.
io3; Hale v. Henkel (igo6) 201 U. S. 43, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370, 50 L Ed. 652,
2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 874, affirming In re Hale, 739 Fed. 496, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec.
8o4; McAllister v. Henkel (q006) 2oi U. S. go, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 385, 50 L Ed.
671.2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 919; Nelson v. U. S., 201 U. S. 92,26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 35
5o L. Ed. 673, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. g2o; Alexander v. U. S. (igo6) 2o U. S. 117,
-6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356, 5o L Ed. 686, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 945; U. S. v. Winslow (1912) 227 U. S. 202, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 253, 57 L- Ed. 253, affirming 195 Fed.
578; U. S. v. Patterson (1912) 201 Fed. 697, 2o5 Fed. 29; Nash v. U. S.
(1913) 229 U. S. 373, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 780, 57 L Ed. 780, reversing 186 Fed.
489; U. S. v. New Departure lMg. Co. (7913) 2o4 Fed. io7; U. S. v. Pacific
& Arctic Rwy. Co. (1913) 228 U. S. 87, 33 Sup. Ct Rep. 443, 57 L Ed. 443.
'See note 7, ante. and note 23, post.
Bigelow v. Calumet and Heckla 'Mining Co. (rgo7) x55 Fed. 869, 3
Fed. A. T. Dec. 293, reversed on other grounds in 167 Fed. 704, 3 Fed. A. T.
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combination, 22 although there is a recent ambiguous case where
the court seemed to recognize the right of the plaintiff to bring
a suit in equity based solely on injury to the plaintiff by alleged
23
violation of the act.
So also in a suit on a covenant in restraint of
trade, 24 or in
a proceeding by one member of a combination against another
member to enforce its terms, either party may set up the illegality
of the covenant just as at common law.2 5
Mr. Justice Brewer, in a dissenting opinion in Continental
WI'all Paper Co. v. TVoight & Sons Co.,- took the position that
the three remedies prescribed in the act are exclusive, and that
therefore in a suit on a contract, one of the parties cannot set up
in defence the illegality of the agreement under the act. This
dicton, however, may be disregarded in view of the overwhelmDec. 593, which was affirmed in (19o9) 767 Fed. 721. 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 6M8;
bill by minority stockholder to enjoin stock control by a competing corporation. Steele v. United Fruit Co. (191i) io Fed. 631, 4 Fed. A. T. Dec. 386;
Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson (1908) 209 U.-S. 423, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep.
572. 52 L. Ed. 865, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 357. affirming 87 Pac. Rep. 315, 3 Fed. A.
T. Dec. 122; bill by stockholder to set aside a lease made by the corporation
in violation of the act. Clarke v. Central R. R. and Banking Co. of Georgia
(1892) So Fed. 338, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 17: question arose on a motion to
modify an interlocutory decree relating to the voting of stock in the corporation. Blindell, el al., v. Hagen, et al. (893), 54 Fed. 40, I Fed. A. T.
Dec. io6. 56 Fed. 696, x Fed. A. T. Dec. 182; injunction issued restraining
the defendants, probably members of a labor union, from preventing the
plaintiffs from shipping a crew for their vessel. rested on grounds apart from
the Act of i89o. Metcalf v. American School Furniture Co. (1goi) 1o8 Fed.
909, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 75. 113 Fed. ioao, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 711, 122 Fed. 115, 2
Fed. A. T. Dec. 234. Field v. Barber Asphalt Co. (igo2) x94 U. S. 68, 24
Sup. Ct. Rep. 784, 48 L. Ed. 1142, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. -555 affirming as to this
point 117 Fed. 925, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 192. National Harrow Co. v. Hench
(1897) 83 Fed. 36, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 742, affirming 76 Fed. 667, 1 Fed. A. T.
Dec. 6Io, see 84 Fed. 226, I Fed. A. T. Dec. 746; injunction to restrain breach
refused. American Biscuit 'Mfg. Co. v. Klotz (1891) 44 Fed. 721, 1 Fed. A.
T. Dec. 2; court refused to appoint a receiver.
nLeonard v. Abner-Drury Brewing Co. (i9o5) 25 Appeal (D. C.) Cases,
161, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. .
Mannington v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co. (9To) 183 Fed. 133, 3 Fed. A. T.
Dec. 825; in Dobson v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co. (1913), 2o6 Fed. 125,
proceedings in equity were brought under §7. and the case arose on - motion
to set aside service. No attention was paid to the form of action.
Cravens v. Carter-Crume Co. (1899) 92 Fed. 479, I Fed. A. T. Dec. 983.
Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co. (i9o6) T42 Fed.
531. 2 Fed. A. T. Dcc. 855. reversed on other grounds in 14 Fed. 358. 3 Fed.
A. T. Dec. 272.
(1909) 212 U. S. 227 at 273, 29 Sup. Ct Rep. 28o, 53 L Ed. 486. 3 Fed.
A. T. Dec. 48o at 523.
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ing weight of authority to the contrary. But a party to the contract will not be refused relief where he is innocent because the
7
other party is guilty of an illegal attempt to control the market,2
and the plaintiff cannot recover for goods delivered under and
in pursuance of the terms of the illegal combination' 28 yet tile

circumstance that a plaintiff is a member of an illegal combination
or a corporation organized and existing in violation of the law
does not prevent it from enforcing contracts it may have made
with the persons not members of the combination. 29
"See cases cited note 48, post.
" Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight & Sons Co. (19O9) 212 U. S. 227,
29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280, 53 L. Ed. 486, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 48o. Defendant was
coerced into entering into the contract. Strong dissent here by Holmes, I.,
and there is considerable doubt as to whether the case was correctly decided.
The proper elucidation of this point however, involves a question in the
illegality of contracts. Was not the parol sale of the goods independent of
the general combination agreement and therefore unaffected by the illegality
of the latter, s. c. 78 C. C. 567, 2o4 U. S. 673. See, however, note 22 HA~v.
LAW REV., p. 435.
" Strait, et al., v. Nat. Harrow Co. (1892) 5i Fed. 8ft. i Fed. A. T. Dec.
52; infringer of a patent may not maintain a bill to restrain defendant from
bringing infringement suits on the ground that defendant company is an
illegal combination under the Act of i8go. General Elec. Co. v. Wise (1903),
zig Fed. 922, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 2o5; corporation patentee may restrain infringement notwithstanding membership in an illegal combination with
third parties. Otis Elevator Co. v. Geiger, et al. (i9oi), 107 Fed. 131,
2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 66, semble; pleading of the defendant in the answer too
vague. Nat. Folding Box & Paper Co. v. Robertson, et al. (zgoo), 99 Fed.
985, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 4, plaintiff may recover, notwithstanding the patent
was assigned to it in pursuance of the illegal combination. See also U. S.
Fire Escape, etc., Co. v. Halstead Co. (1912) 195 Fed. 295; Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Laemmle, et al. (gio), 178 Fed. 104, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 764;
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Ullman. et al. (igio), x86 Fed. 174, 4 Fed.
A. T. Dec. 46, defendant not helped by allegation in the answer that the suit
is not brought in good faith to prevent infringement, but for the purpose of
making the illegal combination, etc., effective. Cf., Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co. (1912) 227 U. S. 8, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2o2, 57 L Ed. 202 (191o),
179 Fed. 115, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 794, semble, accord. The Charles E. Wiswell
( 1896) 74 Fed. 8o2, i Fed. A. T. Dec. 608; no defense to a bill for towage
that the plaintiff tug o%ners are members of an association illegal under the
act, affirmed in 86 Fed. 671, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 85o, on the additional ground
that the association was legal. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. (19o2),
184 U. S. 540,22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431, 46 L.Ed. 679, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. ix8, affirming 99 Fed. 354, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. i; purchaser of a commodity cannot refuse
to pay the price due on the ground ttiat the seller is subject to the provisions
of the act. Chicago Wall Paper Mills Co. v. General Paper Co. (I9O6) 147 Fed.
491, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 1027; Hadley Dean P. G. Co. v. Highland G. Co.
(igo6) 143 Fed. 242, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. g4; Northwestern Consol. Milling
Co. v. Callum & Son (1910), 177 Fed. 786, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 759, semble.
International Harvester Co. of America v. Oliver (1xi) 192 Fed. 59. The
dictum contra in Nat. Harrow Co. v. Quick (1895) 67 Fed. 130, 3 Fed. A. T.
Dec. 443. may be disregarded; s. c. on other grounds, 74 Fed. 236, I Fed. A.
T. Dec. 608; Coca-Cola Co. v. American Druggists Syndicate (1912) 200 Fed.
107.
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A court of equity will sometimes, however, in a case where
the granting of relief is a matter of grace, refuse assistance to
a plaintiff who is subject to the condemnation of the statute.' 0
CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF

TRADE.

Almost the entire law of restraints on trade turned on the
validity of so-called contracts in restraint of trade and it is
perhaps natural that the judges in discussing the subject in modern times should approach it from that point of view. This is
unfortunate, however, and has caused great confusion.
We have already pointed out 81 that covenants in restraint
of trade are objectionable in modern times only when a combination, by taking such covenants, eliminates competitors and
obtains control of the market, or when a number of persons, by
entering into such a contract, form a combination obnoxious to
the law. The old principles of the law have disappeared with
changed conditions. The law no longer has any concern about
the party restrained being deprived of the means of a livelihood,
and there is no danger, under the enlarged conditions of business
in modern times, of an individual obtaining control of the market by taking such covenants. The Act of 189o, however, took
no account of the law in this particular, and blindly condemned
every contract in restraint of trade and subjected every person
who entered into such a contract or who achieved or attempted
to achieve a monopoly by entering into such a contract, to the
penalties of the act. It may perhaps be assumed that Congress did
not intend such a result.
The circumstance that language so widely varying from the
probable real intention was used is another reason why the rule
of liberal construction should be adopted. Covenants in restraint
of trade may be taken by an individual or by a combination or
form part of a combination. The last case is discussed under the
heading of combination.
"Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Frank, et al. (igoi), ixo Fed. 689, 2 Fed.
A. T. Dec. 81 ; railroad company, member of an illegal trunk line association,
refused an injunction to restrain ticket brokers against dealing in tickets
isstved under the terms of the association.
n 12 COLUIBIA LAw R IEw, 97-133, 220-251, especially 246-251.
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The question as to the validity of a contract in restraint
of trade may come up in several ways: (i) where the United
States files a bill in equity utinder Section 4; (2) where an
individual proceeds at law for treble damages under Section
7. In each of these cases the contract must affect interstate commerce; (3) proceedings independently of the act in the Federal
courts on other grounds of jurisdictioni, such as diverse citizenship, where the validity of a covenant in restraint of trade is
drawn into question. Here the trade restrained need not be
interstate trade. If it is, the provisions of the act are to be
applied; if not, the common law or the principles of the act by
way of analogy, and in each case the facts may present a covenant by one party to restrain trade or a covenant by both parties
to restrain trade.
We shall first discuss cases of proceedings independently of
the act.
CONTRACTS OF SALE IN

RESTRAINT

OF TRADE.

Cases still frequently occur where the vendor of property
or the goodwill of a business enters into a covenant with the
vendee in restraint of his, the vendor's, trade, and the question
o
arises, how far in a suit between the parties is the Act of 189
to be applied? Although there are some expressions in the
2
reports to the effect that the act does not apply to cases of this
kind the decisions seem to point to a contrary conclusion.

In CiicinnatiPacket Co. v. Bay,"3 there was a sale of certain
river steam boats, with a covenant by the sellers not to engage
in competition for five years, and upon suit being brought by the
sellers for a portion of the purchase price, the buyer set up in
defence the illegality of the contract, which defence was overruled.
Holmes, J., said that the circumstance that the contract related
'2Swan. J.. in A. Booth & Co. v. Davis,

127

Fed. 875 at 877, 878,

2

Fed.

A. T. Dec. 318 at 322, 323; Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Bay, Holmes. J. (9o6),
2oo U. S. i79; ,6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2o8, sn L. Ed. 428, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 867;

Severns, J., dissenting in Darius Cole Transportation Co. v. White Star Line
(i911), 186 Fed. 63 at 68, 4 Fed. A. T. Dec. 36 at 43.
" (igo6) 200 U. S. 179, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 28, 50 L Ed. 428, 2 Fed. A. T.

Dec. 867.
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to interstate commerce, although: not clear, would be assumed,
although the boat line seemed to run almost exclusively between
Ohio ports, but even on this supposition that it was manifest that
interference with such commerce was insignificant and incidental
and not the dominant purpose of the contract, if it was actually
thought of at all. He also said that the buyers obviously purchased that freedom from competition-as part of their bargain,
and that such a covenant not made as a device to control commerce did not fall within the act, and that it had been repeatedly
suggested that such a contract is not within the letter or spirit
of the statute, apparently making the test the intent to control on
the part of the covenantee and not the reasonableness of the
restraint. There was also a covenant on the part of the purchaser to maintain rates, the invalidity of which, under the act,
was not passed on by the court, it being deemed an entirely
subordinate undertaking of the buyer.
In Robinson v. Suburban Brick Co.,3 4 there was a sale of a

manufacturing business, with a covenant not to engage in the
same business within fifty miles for ten years, which was enforced
in equity in a suit by the covenantee against the covenantor on
the ground, inter alia, although the parties lived in different
states, that the covenant related to manufacture within a state,
and was not, therefore, subject to the provision of the Act of
189o. It did not appear whether the fifty miles would extend
over a state line.
In American Brake Beanm Co. v. Pungs,35 there was a sale
of a patent with a covenant by the vendor not to compete during
the life of the patent, and in a suit by a vendor for the consideration, it was held that the covenant was valid and a verdict for
the plaintiff was affirmed without reference to the Act of i89o.
Grosscup, J., curiously enough, said that the covenant was not
in restraint of trade, merely binding the vendor to stay out. The
covenant was. of course, in restraint of vendor's trade and might
restrain the trade of others. The vendor, by the terms of the
contract, could re-enter the trade upon paying back the considera" (19o4) 127 Fed. 804, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 312.
" (1905) 141 Fed. 923, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 826.
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tion, and the court said "At most it is an agreement merely that
if the vendor renews his connection with the trade, he shall
return the consideration received." The covenant apparently
related to interstate business, but that point was not raised.
In A. Booth &- Co. v. Davis, et al.,a8 there was a sale of a
fish business by a corporation, and a covenant was entered into
by the stockholders not to engage in the same business for ten
years. A preliminary injunction was issued to enforce performance in a suit by the covenantee against the covenantors. The
court said the covenant was reasonable and not subject to the
provisions of the Act of 189o. On appeal the decision was
affirmed on the ground that there was no direct interference with
interstate commerce.
In Darius Colc Transportation Co. v. White Star Line,3?
there was a suit in admiralty for the recovery of two instalments
of rent due on a steamer running between ports in different states.
The lessor had agreed not to compete during the term of the lease,
and it was held that there could be no recovery of rent, the covenant being void, as the evidence (particularly the circumstance
that the rent received was more than the steamer would have
earned if operated independently) showed a dominant intention
of the parties to maintain a monopoly.8 s
In McConnell v. Cantors McConncll Co.,a 9 the vendee of a
business was not permitted to enforce in equity a covenant not
to compete entered into by the vendor, it appearing that the contract and covenant were made in order to assist the plaintiff in
stifling competition and acquiring a monopoly. The case was
heard on bill and answer, which latter averred that the plaintiff
was acquiring a monopoly. The court placed the decision on the
grourid that a refusal to enforce would tend to minimize the number of such transactions.
"0(i9o4) 127 Fed. 875, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 318, affirmed in 131 Fed. 31,a
Fed. A. T. Dec. s66.
0(x9II) 86 Fed. 63, 4 Fed. A. T. Dec. 36.
"See also Phillips v. Iola Portland Cement Co. (9o3) 125 Fed. 593,2 Fed.
A. T. Dec. 284, where a covenant by the vendee not to resell in competition
with a vendor was held valid.

" (1907)

i52 Fed. 321, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. i85, reversing 14O Fed. 412, 2

Fed. A. T. Dec. 817, see

14o

Fed. 987, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 825.
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In Shaw'nee Compress Co. v. Anderson,40 there was a lease
by a corporation to another corporation with a covenant by the
lessor not to compete. On bill filed by a minority stockholder of
the lessor corporation, the lease was set aside and its execution
and performance enjoined, it appearing that the covenant was
greater than the protection of the lessee required. It was not
necessary, the court said, the case coming from a territory, to
decide whether the covenant was void under the common law, the
Oklahoma statute, or the Act of i89o.
The common law principle, that the validity of a covenant
in restraint of trade is determined by the reasonableness of the
restraint imposed, has been introduced by the Federal courts into
the discussion of the subject in a most unfortunate and confusing way. We have already noticed the argument that the
absence of any definition in the act, and the use of the word
unlawful in the title point to the conclusion that the validity of a
covenant in restraint of trade is, since the act, to be determined
by common law principles.
It is said that the term "contracts in restraint of trade at
common law" included all contracts which in effect restrained
trade, some of which were void as unreasonable and others valid
as reasonable; that therefore the statute, when it used the words
"every contract" included all and condemned the reasonable and
unreasonable, and that no exception or limitation can be added
without putting in the act words which were not inserted by
Congress. 41
On the other hand, it has been said that the term "contracts
in restraint of trade" at common law only referred to and embraced those contracts which were void as unreasonable, and that
therefore the statute does not apply to the contracts which are
valid because reasonable.
Mr. Chief Justice White appears to be responsible for this
idea, and his reasoning in support of it is open to several serious
a(x9o8) 209 U. S. 423, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 572, 52 L. Ed. 865, 3 Fed. A. T.
Dec. 357, affirming 87 Pac. Rep. 315, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 122.
u Peckham, J., in U. S. v. Trans-Mo. Freight Assn. (1897) 166 U. S. 29o
at 328, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540, 41 L.Ed. 1007, 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 68 at 682, 683.
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He says, in his dissenting opinion in United States

v. FreightAssn.,4 3
"Is it correct to say that at common law the words 'restraint of trade' had a generic signification which embraced
all contracts which restrained the freedom of trade, whether
reasonable or unreasonable, and, therefore, that all such
contracts are within the meaning of the words 'every contract in restraint of trade'? I think a brief consideration of
the history and development of the law on the subject will
not only establish the inaccuracy of this proposition, but
also demonstrate that the words 'restraint of trade' embrace only contracts which unreasonably restrain trade, and,
therefore, that reasonable contracts, although they, in some
measure, 'restrain trade,' are not within the meaning of the
words."
Now he starts out in his opinion with these words: 48
"It is unnecessary to refer to the authorities showing
that although a contract may in some measure restrain trade,
it is not for that reason void or even voidable unless the restraint which it produces be unreasonable."
In this statement lie expressly recognizes the correct use of
the word "rcasonable" which is in its application to the restraint
and not to the contract. He starts out with the fallacy that if
the act of Congress prohibits reasonable contracts it is unreasonable, forgetting in this assumption that the test of a reasonable restraint of trade is determined by law, and when the
law is changed by statute, that which was before reasonable
may become unreasonable, or vice versa. The authority which
changes the standard of reasoning cannot be condemned as unreasonable by the standard which it changes. True, the statute may
not agree with the notions of justice, sound policy or proper
economic legislation which may be entertained by the various
judges of the court, and may be considered as unreasonable from
that point of view. The use of the word "unreasonable," however, in that connection is entirely different from the use of the
word "reasonable" or "unreasonable" as applied to a restraint of
(1897) 166 U. S. 29o at 346, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540, 41 L. Ed. ioo7,
A. T. Dec. 648 at 699.
aOn pp. 34 3 of the U. S. Report and 696 of the Fed. A. T. Dee.

!

Fed.
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trade. He then examines a number of decisions andtextbooks, and
comes to the conclusion that the English and American authorities warrant the statement that a contract in reasonable restraint
of trade is not a contract in restraint of trade. In reaching this
conclusion, he uses the words "contract in restraint of trade" in
its loose and erroneous sense, and entirely overlooks the accurate
use of the English judges in which they speak of the covenant as
being in restraint of trade.
This is illustrated by his misconception of the decision in the
House of Lords in the case of Nordcnfclt v. The Maxim Nordenfcldt Guts & Ammunition Co. 4" He states that decision as holding that if a contract was reasonable it was not a contract in
restraint of trade, and if unreasonable, it was. The language of
the learned lords in that case may be scanned in vain for any such
statement of the law. All of them speak of the covenant as being
in restraint of trade, and use the word "reasonable" as qualifying
either that or the restraint and do not in any case speak of a
reasonable contract. Lord Chancellor Herschell 5 states that the
question is whether the covenant entered into between the parties
is void as in restraint of trade, and then points out that it is contained in a certain agreement and recites the agreement.
Mr. Chief Justice White, therefore, cites no authority for
his conclusion and he is entirely opposed to the highest and best
English authority. Every text writer, almost without exception,
uses the phrase in the sense in which he says it should not be
used and he misapprehends the effect of the English decisions.
His reasoning in the Standard Oil case is further an amplification
of the same fallacy, contains no further contribution to the subject, and refers to no other authorities in support of his conclusion.
Ve have already pointed out that the term "contracts in
restraint of trade" is entirely inaccurate and contrary to the best
usage of the English judges, who nearly always use the more
accurate phrase 48 "covenants in restraint of trade." The term
" (j894) App. Cases 535.
41 At p. 538 of the report.
" 12 CoLumBiA LAw REviEw, 97-133, 220-251,

see especially 246,

251.
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"contract in restraint of trade" is, at its best, a loose term of the
text writers and judges, and when we look beneath the surface
as we must, and reason exactly, we at once perceive that the
contract does not restrain the trade at all, but the performance of
a covenant in a contract may or may not restrain trade.
A covenant in restraint of trade, when performed, restrains
the trade of the covenantor directly, and may or may not restrain
the trade of third parties, and if it does restrain them does so
indirectly. It is the indirect restraint on the trade of third parties
with which the law is probably solely concerned today. If this is
so, we may say with some accuracy that a contract in restraint of
trade is a contract containing a covenant the performance of
which unduly restrains the trade of third parties, and unless it
does produce that restraint is valid at common law. The language of Mr. Chief Justice White, however, is so involved, that
it is almost impossible to ascertain his meaning. It is probable,
however, from some expressions in the opinion, that he had in
mind the indirect restraint on trade arising out of the direct
restraint imposed by the covenantor on himself by the performance of the covenant, and then only when it unduly or unreasonably restrained the trade of third parties.' 7
CONTRACTS OF

EXCLUSIVE SALE.

An individual may unquestionably make an exclusive" contract of sale of his product or the commodity he is dealing in for
a term of years, and such a contract was valid at common law
unless the purchaser was, by the taking of a sufficient number of
such contracts, acquiring a control of the market, and even in
that case the covenant-or could enforce the contract and recover
the consideration unless he was a party to the unlawful scheme
of the buyer. A liberal construction of the Act of i8go leads
to the same conclusion, and such seems to be the purport of the
decisions. Where a manufacturer sells the entire product of his
plant, and brings suit to recover an amount due under the contract, the defence that the covenant is illegal because the pur" For a discussion of what is an undue or unreasonable restraint of trade,
see infra.
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chaser is endeavoring to obtain control of the market will not
prevail against the plaintiff, who is ignorant of the scheme of the
defendant and of similar contracts, the contract sued onl being
48
valid in itself.
WVhere all the parties to the contract are concerned in the
scheme to control the buying or selling, the case becomes one of
a combination and loses its peculiarity as a covenant in restraint
of trade.
In Cravens v. Cartcr-CrunieCo.. " a combination of woodenware manufacturers was effected, and a contract made in pursuance of such combination by which the manufacturer was guaranteed a certain sum as dividends on his stock in the central
company in consideration of the closing up of his factory for a
year. The contract was held void, and the plaintiff was unable
to recover the amount due under the contract.
There have only been two cases of proceedings by the United
States to enjoin the performance of contracts of exclusive sale.
The first was Chesapeake & Ohio Fuel Co. v. United States,5 ° in
which case a contract by the Company with fourteen producers of
coal. by which the Company agreed to take the entire product
of the mines for five years intended for the western market,
was held void and its lerformnance restrained and the contracts
ordered dissolved. It was a clear case of a corloration obtaining ky a number of covenants control of the market.
The second case is that of United States v. Reading Co., et
al.31 In this case a number of railroad companies running between
tidewater and the anthracite coal mines, entered into contracts
with the various mine owners tributary to their lines, by which
they purchased the entire output of the mines forever, and agreed
to pay them 65 per cent. of the selling price at tidewater, retaining the balance for themselves for freight and selling expenses.
The court below held. with'only one dissent (Buffington, J.).
Carter-Crume Co. v. Perrung (1898) 86 Fed. 439. 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 844.
(1899) 92 Fed. 479, z Fed. A. T. Dec. 983.
(1902) 'ii Fed. 6o. 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 151, affirming to5 Fed. 93, 2 Fed.

A. T. Dec. 34.
" (1912) 226 U. S. 324, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. go. 57 L Ed. go (1o).
ax to this point, x83 Fed. 427, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 866.

reversing.
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that these contracts were not in restraint of trade. It appeared
that the defendants controlled 7o per cent. to 75 per cent. of the
annual supply of anthracite coal. The court dwelt on the fact
that the arrangement made by the carrying companies was made
in view of the history and condition of the coal trade, and that
it was an advantageous and highly commendable arrangement,
and although it affected interstate trade, did not violate the act.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the
contracts, although possibly valid considered singly, plainly violated the law because the covenantee, by taking these contracts,
acquired such a control of the market as to violate the provisions
of the act. This case represents the clearest apprehension by the
Supreme Court of the principle that too great a control of the
market by the combination is the evil aimed at by the act. While
this case relates to a natural monopoly, it does not appear that
as to the 65 per cent. contracts the court was influenced by that
fact. The only bearing of that circumstance is that the combination, because it was a case of natural monopoly, more easily
acquired a control of the market, and a similar arrangement as
to other commodities might not result in such control.5a
DIRECT AND INDIRECT RESTRAINTS.

While the distinction between that which is direct and that
which is indirect seems tolerably clear in its application to ordinary affairs, so far as the law of restraints on trade is concerned,
no guiding principle can be gathered from the authorities. While
there is no authority for the distinction, it seems clear that a
covenant in restraint of trade directly restrains the trade of the
covenantor, and if the, performance of that covenant has any
effect on the selling or buying of the particular commodity, then
the trade of the parties engaged in that selling or buying is only
indirectly restrained. Successful competition restrains the trade
of those competed against. Whether that restraint is direct or
"The bill in this case charged a combination in restraint of trade, and
the Supreme Court said that the defendants did, inter alia, combine by and
through the instrumentality of the sixty-five per cent. contracts for the purpose and design of controlling the sale of the independent output at tidewater.
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indirect is open to debate. It may perhaps be classified as a
direct restraint. A monopoly or combination directly restrains
the trade of the members of the monopoly or combination in the
same manner that the performance of a covenant restrains the
trade of the covenantor, and indirectly restrains the trade of the
buying or selling of the commodity embraced by the combination
or monopoly. The successful competition of the combination
or monopoly is the same kind of restraint on the persons competed
against as any other successful competition.
Further complication arises in considering the subject under
discussion from the circumstance that we have to bear in mind
the distinction between trade in general and interstate trade.
The conception of interstate commerce is a technical and artificial
notion arising entirely out of the necessities of our constitutional
law. The learning on the subject is immense and furnishes
ample material for a volume by itself. 53
" It will be impossible to discuss the question of what is interstate commerce within the limits of this article. A few words in passing may not be
out of place. Commerce is made up of a number of separate exchanges of
one thing for another, sometimes by a direct exchange, generally through
the medium of a contract. Where there is a direct exchange, as in the case
of a cash sale with immediate delivery to the purchaser, there is little difficulty. Here there is no interstate exchange or commerce unless the dividing
line between two states comes between the parties. Where there is a contract, the problem is of greater difficulty. If the parties in the formation
of the contract are in different states, the case seems plainly to be one of

interstate commerce. If they are both in one state, and the contract is to be
performed by one in another state, the law is not so plain. In the case of a
carrier at least the case is one of interstate commerce. The carrier has sold
transportation to another state to the shipper, and the contract must be performed in part in another state. A number of other cases may arise. Suppose the contract is made between parties in one state and performed by both
in another state. Is the case the same as where they are in different states
when the contract is formed? A few cases which have arisen under the
act as to the question of interstate commerce are added. In Chesapeake &
Ohio Fuel Company v. U. S. (19o2) sii Fed. 61o; 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. x5r, affirming 105 Fed. 93; 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 34, a number of coal miners situated in
West Virginia agreed to sell the entire product of their mines to a certain
fuel company, all t oal to be shipped West at the price f. o. b. mines, which
was held to be restraint on interstate commerce. In Gibbs v. McNeeley
(19o2) iuS Fed. 120. 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 194, m7 Fed. 210, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec.
71, 102 Fed. 594, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 25; an association of manufacturers and
dealers in shingles, in one state, formed for the purpose of controlling the
production and the price of the shingles, made only in that state, was held to
affect interstate commerce, because it necessarily affected sales in other states,
the case arising in an action under §7, by a dealer in the same state. This
case illustrates the proposition that a contract need not in terms refer to
interstate commerce, if its purpose and effect are to restrain interstate corn-

98

UNIVERSITY

OF PENXSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

The chief difficulty is that the Federal courts have failed to
keep clear the distinction between a restraint as a direct or indirect restraint, and a restraint as operating on state or interstate
commerce. Only one expression has been found referring to
this distinction, which is of vital importance to the clear under5
standing of the application of the act. '
The vague use of the terms "direct" and "indirect" by the
courts is illustrated in the decisions collected in the note.5 It
will appear from an examination of these cases that the terms
"direct" and "indirect" are used in an attempt to distinguish a restraint on interstate commerce from a restraint on
intra-state commerce, an entirely inadmissible use of the terms,
because the distinction is between the trade restrained and not
between the kind of restraints on the trade. It is first necessary
to conclude what kind of trade is involved, and that question is
answered by principles entirely apart from the law of restraints
merce. In The Charles F Wiswell, 86 Fed. 671, ! Fed. A. T. Dec. 8o, it was
held that the members of the Hudson River Tugboat Asso. holding coasting
licenses and engaged in toi'ing on the waters of the Hudson River above
Poughkeepsie and entirely within the State of New York, were not engaged
in interstate commerce. In U. S. v. Coal Dealers' Asso. (1898) 85 Fed. 252,
i Fed. A. T. Dec. 749, an association of retail dealers in coal, in San Francisco, combined with miners and shippers of coal from other states all residing in, and doing business in Sari Francisco. The combination controlled
all the coal mines accessible to -the San Francisco market. The court cited
the Original Package decision, said there was no difference between that and
the case at bar, and that the combination affected interstate commerce, relying
on the case of Uihited States v. Hopkins, 82 Fed. 529, i Fed. A. T. Dee. 725,
in the lower court, which at that time had not been reversed by the Supreme
Court.

C"For the purpose of clear exposition, the facts set forth in the petition
should be separated in two groups-those that are intended to bring the
transaction within the body of interstate commerce and those that are intended to fix upon such transaction the character of unlawful combination
and conspiracy." Grosscup, J., in U. S. v. Swift, 122 Fed. 529 at W2, 2 Fed.
A. T. Dec. 237 at 24!.
"In U.S. v. E. C. Knight Co. (1895) is6 U. S. , i5 Sup. Ct. 29,39
I- Ed. 325. 1 Fed. A. T. Dec. 379. affirming 6o Fed. 934, Fed. A. T. Dec. 258,
which affirmed 6o Fed. 3o6, i Fed. A. T. Dec. 250, one of the grounds of
decision was that as there was no proof of any intent to restrain interstate
commerce, the fact that the interstate commerce might be indirectly affected
was not enough to entitle complainants to a decree. In U. S. v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council of New Orleans, ct al. (1893), s4 Fed. 994, I
Fed. A. T. Dec. i io, a sympathetic strike of warehousemen and draymen was
held to be a restraint on interstate commerce because it affected the transportation of interstate shipment through the city where the strike was in
effect. In Hopkins v. United States (1898), 171 U. S. 578, 19 Sup. Ct: Rep.
4o, 43 L Ed. 29o, I Fed. A. T. Dec. 94i, reversing &4 Fed. i108, x Fed. A. T.
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on trade. If the trade is intra-state, then the restraint is not
cognizable under the act whether direct or indirect. If the trade
is interstate, then the restraint may be void whether direct or
indirect. It is probable that the majority of the restraints which
are void are indirect restraints. It is therefore a confusion in
terminology to say that an indirect restraint on interstate commerce is not subject to the act.
Dec. 748, 82 Fed. 529, I Fed. A. T. Dec. 725, the members of a live stock yard
exchange did their business at stock yards situate on each side of the dividing
line between two states. The members of the stock exchange received stock
in consignment from owners in different states and sold to persons in other
states. Held that the character of the business was to be determined by facts
occurring at Kansas City, and that the circumstances of consignment was immaterial. That there was no direct and immediate effect on interstate commerce, although the cost of conducting interstate commerce might be increased by the operations of the exchange. The rules of the exchange
limited the number of solicitors which each member might send out to different
states which also was held not to be a direct restraint on interstate commerce. Peckham, J., said: "The contract condemned by the statute is one
whose direct and immediate effect is a restraint upon that kind of trade or
commerce which is interstate." It is difficult to distinguish this case from
U. S. v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council, supra. In Anderson v. United
States (1898) 171 U. S. 6o4. i9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 50, 43 L Ed. 300, 1 Fed. A. T.
Dec. 967, see 82 Fed. 998. i Fed. A. T. Dec. 742, the members of a live stock
yard exchange were themselves purchasers of live stock in different states
which they bought and sold to each other and shipped away. Under the
rules of the exchange, they refused to do business with those who would
not enforce their rules. It was held that the combination did not directly
affect interstate commerce. From the remarks of Peckham, J., it appears
that the exchange was unobjectionable anyhow. It would have been much
better to have placed the decision squarely on the ground of a valid combination. The strict interpretation of the statute will and has resulted in many
strained decisions as to what is interstate commerce. The court distinguished
U. S. v. Jellico Mountain Coal Company and U. S. v. Coal Dealers' Association on the ground that in those cases the agreement provided for the fixing
of prices. In Union Sewer Pipe Co. v. Connelly (igoo), 99 Fed. 354 a Fed.
A. T. Dec. i, the court said that at common law a contract not in itself in
restraint of trade is not void because one of the parties thereto is a party
to the contract which is in restraint of trade, that the one contract is based
indirectly on the other, and that the case was not within the Anti-Trust Act
because that act only covers contracts which are themselves directly in restraint of trade, and does not affect those which are indirectly in restraint
of trade. Here the word indirect is used to distinguish between two different contracts. The ground of decision may be better stated thus: The
circumstance that the plaintiff is engaged in the performance of a contract
in restraint of trade is immaterial in adjusting his rights under another contract with a third party. In Ellis v. Inman & Poulson & Co. (igo3) 1Z4 Fed.
56, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. -68 reversed in 131 Fed. 182, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 577, all
the lumber manufacturers of Portland entered into a combination to monopolize the local lumber market, advance the price of lumber, and refused to
sell their lumber to consumers who purchased at outside mills. Plaintiff purchased at the outside mill and defendant refused to sell to him, it was held
that he could recover and judgment sustaining demurrer to complaint was
reversed. The defendant contented that the inability of plaintiff to buy was
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We furthermore must not confuse the question of whether
the necessary effect of the combination is to restrain trade with
thi question whether it indirectly restrains trade. The two are
occasioned solely by the inability of outside mills to furnish the lumber they
dealt in, and which the plaintiff wished to buy. The court said that the
circumstance that no one had invested capital in such mills did not render
the restraint of interstate commerce any the less direct and necessary. In
Phillip v. Iola Portland Cement Co. (1903) 125 Fed. 593, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec.
284, a manufacturer of cement in Kansas, contracted to sell cement to B., in
Texas, B. agreeing not to sell the cement out of Texas. B. refused to accept
and pay for a portion of the amount contracted for, and when sued, set up
in defence that the contract was void under the Act of i8go. Judgment was
entered for the plaintiff. Sanborn, J., 125 Fed. at 597, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. at
286. said: "if the contract had the effect of restraining the vendee from
using the product they purchased to compete with other jobbers and manufacturers out of Texas, this restriction was not the chief purpose or main
effect of this contract of sale, but merely indirect and immatcrial incident
of it. The agreement of sale imposed no direct restraint upon competition
in commerce among the states, did not constitute a restraint of that commerce and was not obnoxious to the Act of July 2, i89o." In Montague &
Co. v. Lowry (igo4) i93 U. S. 38; 24 Supr. Ct. 307, 48 L. Ed. 6o8, 2 Fed. A. T.
Dec. 327, a combination between middlemen in onc state and manufacturers
in another state was held a direct restraint on interstate commerce, although
it only affected the intra-state market, and prevented a dealer not a member
of the association from buying from the manufacturers outside of the state.
The restraint on intra-state trade and the restraint on interstate trade were
inseparable. In Cammors-NMcConnell Co. v. McConnell, i4o Fed. 412, 2 Fed.
A. T. Dec. 817, 140 Fed. 987, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 825, a covenant was probably
attached to the sale of a good-will and bound the covenantor not to engage
in the importing and selling of tropical fruits or in any other business in
competition with the vendee, and was enforced in equity. The court apparently held that there was nothing to show that the covenantee was obtaining a monopoly or control of the market or intended to, which was different
ground from that assigned because the contract might easily, in its performance, restrain interstate trade. Toulmin, J., said: "The indirect effect of the
contract under consideration might be to enhance the price of tropical fruit,
but the contract itself would not directly or necessarily, for that reason, be
in restraint of interstate trade or commerce. While it might tend to restrain
such trade, the restraint would be an indirect result." "A contract may, in
a variety of ways, affect interstate commerce and yet be entirely valid because the interference produced by the contract is not direct. The fact that
trade and commerce might be indirectly affected is not sufficient. The effect
must be direct and proximate." In Arkansas Brokerage Co., et al., v. Dunn
and Powell, Inc. (igog) 173 Fed. 899. 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 752, a number of
manufacturers in different states organized a corporation to do their jobbing business for them in a certain town. Plaintiff, a jobber, with whom
they had formerly done business, and who had now lost their trade, sued
under §7. It was held that there was no restraint of interstate trade, that
the volume remained the same as before, and the whole field was opened to
competition, and there wa. only an indirect, incidental and unimportant
restraint on interstate commLrce. In Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co.
(1913) 227 U. S. 8, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2o2, 57 L. Ed. 202, affirming (igo) 179

Fed. ii5. 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 794, a contract by which a corporation engaged
in interstate selling constituted another corporation its sole selling agent, was
held valid (in the court below), because even though it could be said to
incidentally or indirectly restrain competition by giving the corporation the
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not coterminous.5 6 It is sometimes said that if the necessary effect of the contract or combination is to restrain trade, it is void,
even though it does not in terms refer to interstate trade. What
this phraseology probably means, more accurately expressed, is
that if the contract or combination does actually produce a restraint, it is void, even though on its face it does not call for such
a restraint. We must. however, remember that the case may arise
before the contract has been performed or the combination carried
out or after it has been completed and the restraint produced.
The language of the court will differ in the two cases, and, in the
first case, looking forward, they will talk about the necessary
effect, that is to say, decide what the contract or combination will
inevitably produce; and, in the second case, they will say what it
has produced.5 7
The judges also have a way of saying in a given case
that there is no restraint on trade, *when what they really
mean is that the restraint is not unlawful. This springs
probably from the unfortunate notion, which we have already
referred to, that the term "contracts in restraint of trade" at
exclusive right to sell its product, it would not violate the statute because
such incidental and indirect effect does not conic within the provisions of
the act. In Field v. Asphalt Co. (19o4) 194 U. S. 6M8, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 784,
48 L. Ed. 1142, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 555, 117 Fed. 925, 2 Fed. A. T. Dec. 192,
it was decided that the specification in a city ordinance of a particular kind
of asphalt to be used in paving the city streets had a remote and indirect
bearing on interstate commerce and was valid, although competitive bidding
was impossible by reason of the specification. The true ground of decision
was that the parties had a right to make a contract for themselves. The
case arose on a taxpayer's bill to have the city restrained from paying for
the paving of certain streets with that particular asphalt. The last sentence
of the fourth paragraph of the syllabus in the official report is insensible:
something has been omitted. In Lowe v. Lawlor (igo8) 208 U. S. 274, 28
Sup. Ct. Rep. 30T, 52 L. Ed. 488, 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 324, a combination of
laboring men, none of whom were engaged in interstate trade, declared a boycott against a manufacturer, thus interfering with his sales. It was held in
an action under §7 by the employer against the union that the defendants had
imposed a direct restraint on interstate commerce, although a negligible amount
of interstate business might be affected.
"This error was made by Knappen, J., in Bigelow v. Calumet & Heckla
Mlining Co. (i9o8) x67 Fed. 7o4 at 712, et seq., 3 Fed. A. T. Dec. 593 at 6o5,
et seq.

" "We do not think that the act contemplates that the combination therein
made unlawful must be one which shall by its terms refer to interstate commerce. It is enough if its purpose and effect are necessary to restrain interstate trade." Gilbert, J., in Gibbs v. McNeeley (1902) 118 Fed. x2o at 726, 2
Fed. A. T. Dec. 194 at 203. See also U. S. v. F. C. Knight Co. (1895) x56 U.
S. x. 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249, 39 L Ed. 325.
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common law only refers to unlawful restraints, from which it
must follow that a lawful restraint is no restraint at all. Restraints on trade are numerous, but they may be arranged
under several well-defined headings, and under each heading they
may be further arranged according to the amount of the restraint
actually produced. When we consider each heading, therefore,
we will, in proceeding from the less restraints to the greater,
finally reach a point which cannot be accurately pointed out,
where the restraint will become unlawful. It is much better to
say that there are restraints in all these cases, but that some are
lawful and some unlawful, than to make use of ambiguous
phrases, from which it may be inferred that a lawful restraint is
no restraint at all, which statement is merely a contradiction in
terms.
Roland R. Foulke.
Philadelphia.
(To be continued.)

